Parallel and reflective coding structures inclusive of data from both parties to a transaction are propagated beginning with an algorithm derived maker's code, an item code unique to and associated with a single article made by a maker, and data identifying both the maker and the legitimate acquirer. Use of secure hash algorithms, single and double key encryption are suggested to obtain two virtually irreversible parallel coding structures that reflect the identities of the current and previous owner and are also mathematically reflective in that one code is derivable by either code structure in verification of both authenticity and ownership. Multiple modes of verification with coding printed on a receipt for the article are provided including Internet, offline computer, land line and SMS cellular telephone. Authenticity, non-repudiation, proof of legitimate ownership and provenance are provided for any article of value including pharmaceuticals and other consumable product warranting authentification.

Current U.S. Class:	235/375; 235/375
Current Intern'l Class:	G06F 17/00    (20060101)
Field of Search:	235/375

• continued

The preferred derivation of the PIC from the fixed mathematical progression given in equation (5) above: PIC=MF mod (IC); also uses a secure hash algorithm modulo operator that is virtually irreversible mathematically and use of both is not necessary as preferred obtainment of the PIC with the MC as given in equation (11) above uses public key encryption that is specifically reversible but protective of the private key and cannot produce the invariant but unknown PIC without derivation of an invariant code, preferably the MC, with a selected mathematical operator, e.g. single key encryption, providing equivalence between two variable expressions and the invariant code. In the latter the PC is preferably balanced or equated with the variable TC as the private key to produce a constant MC. The TC and the PC vary with each transaction and must be generated in each pedigree node although the single key encryption algorithm, E^S, and its reversal, E^-S, remain invariant.

Use of two variable codes, e.g. TC, PC, together with a fixed code, e.g. MC, in the relation established by single key encryption with an invariant encryption algorithm, E^S, and its reversal, E^-S, in generation of new code in a pedigree node results in a coding progression that is 'stepped' in a manner represented graphically as a step across and a step over; with the first being transfer of the articles concerned and the second the generation of the coding required. This coding generation occurs in a 'pedigree node' as the TD from both parties is used to generate coding reflecting the transaction. The TD initially necessarily contains data specifically identifying the maker preferably with a detail that provides certainty in identification comprising unique verifiable information such as legal name, physical address, phone number, web site address, tax code number, etc., termed a maker's fingerprint (MF) that is compiled in the maker's public client software freely distributed as an authentification tool. Similar information identifying the first legitimate acquirer in also required in generation of the coding required in the first transaction.

This could also be the last transaction, with the first acquirer being a customer, in which case the TD is comprised of the MF or other data identifying the maker who in this instance is also the retailer so that MF=R, and the data identifying the customer (C). The IC is also preferably included in generation of the TC or PC, in any case, and the MF can also be retained through all pedigree nodes so that the customer, even after several intermediary parties involved in pedigree node transactions in distribution before retail to the customer, can preferably be given a sales receipt for the article concerned that bears final transaction data (TD_FINAL) reflecting data identifying the maker and the article as well as the customer and the retailer. TD_FINAL, moreover, can utilize a password (PW) for C if desired. This is not desired In the case of pharmaceuticals, but for many other articles use of a PW rather than data, C, identifying the customer facilitates transfer of the article concerned after the final pedigree node as subsequent legitimate acquirers can prove legitimate ownership with knowledge of the password obtained from the previous legitimate owner.

In any case the data reflecting the identity of the intermediary parties such as distributors, D₁, & D₂, can be dropped from the TD in the flexible coding progression. And data reflecting the identity of the maker can also be dropped from the TD, it is still reflected in other coding, in which preferred case the TD and resulting TC and PC can reflect only the last two parties involved in transaction in the last pedigree node. But even in this case if a PIC that is defined in accordance with equation (5): PIC=MF mod (IC); is utilized then verification of the maker is still provided even though no data identifying the maker is evident to a customer or utilized in the flexible coding progression. And while only two intermediaries between maker and customer enables this situation the customer still has the ability to identify the article, their selves as current owner, the previous owner, and the maker in authentification including proof of provenance.

The identity of all intermediary parties, distributors (D1-Dn), as reflected in the TD and resulting TC and PC can be lost in the coding progression except for the last: the retailer (R). The identities of the customer (C) and the retailer (R) can be verified along with the maker and the article and the identity of the sole distributor can be lost or retained if D is retained in the TD and reflected in the TC and PC. The identities of the customer (C) and the retailer (R) can be verified along with the maker and the article and the identities of the two distributors can be lost or retained if D1 & D2 are retained in the TD and reflected in the TC and PC. In this case, wherein only one intermediary between the customer and the maker exists or the customer wants to sell the article to a second legitimate owner the identity of the intermediary parties becomes moot and the question becomes, to an extent, one of authentification by a second legitimate owner. The use of a password, replacing data identifying the customer in the TD, to facilitate this is recommended.

For purposes of consistent terminology any and all 'intermediaries', inclusive of distributors and retailers, between the maker and the 'customer', are at a time legitimate owners but there is a final pedigree node defining both the 'retailer' and the 'customer' or a first legitimate private owner. Generation of new TD incorporating the identity of a second, or third, or fourth, successive legitimate owner after being sold to a customer by a retailer is possible but would require further pedigree nodes. This is undesirable because the name of the retailer, progression valuable to establishing provenance, could be lost in the coding. The identity of the customer is also desired in the TD for prescription pharmaceuticals wherein secondary ownership is essentially moot as undesirable or illegal.

In contrast to this type of product many articles of value are purchased with the intention of keeping the article, perhaps through generations of a family, and identification of the retailer and the first legitimate owner is considered abundantly sufficient in proof of subsequent ownership for obvious reasons. In corollary, it is desirable in this case to prevent generation means of further TD, TC, or PC reflecting new legitimate ownership as a precaution against theft and retroactive establishment of ownership illegitimately. If transfer of ownership legitimately is desired it is suggested that a password be used in place of C in the TD. Alternatively, a receipt preferably bearing final transaction data TD_FINAL reflecting the identities of the retailer and the first legitimate owner or customer could be transferred with the article and, if desired, a bill of sale also be signed by the first legitimate owner identifying the purchaser: the second legitimate owner. This process can obviously be repeated and the receipt bearing the TD_FINAL provides, at minimum, the means of authenticating the article regardless of the use of a password or any additional bills of sale attesting to legitimate ownership or provenance.

Also, in preferred embodiment, the public client software derives an invariant code, the MC, from TD entered by the owner and the last variable code reflecting the TD dependent TC generated in the last pedigree node: the final pedigree code (PC_FINAL). The terminology is arbitrary but in order to have variable TD reflected in a variable code and provide for derivation of an invariant code by the public client software with entrance of TD and IC there must be a final pedigree node in which the mathematical value of the TD and the other variable code used in equation with that invariant code, MC, is finalized, in TD_FINAL, TC_FINAL, & PC_FINAL and the invariant MC is unknown to the public client software except through this data entry dependent derivation using the reverse of the mathematical operator selected to balance TC & PC.

In example of most preferred embodiment of the principles relating to the present invention utilizing the most secure coding progression discussed above taken, arbitrarily, through four pedigree nodes: the maker generates an IC, MC, & PIC in accordance with equations (5) & (6): PIC=MF mod (IC), MC=E^P {d, PIC}; and in the first pedigree node the data identifying the two parties to the transaction are entered along with the IC to produce the TD in accordance with:

TD=(IC+PO+NO);  (12)

wherein PO=data identifying the previous owner and NO=data identifying the new owner. In the first transaction PO identifies the maker, preferably with MF, and the new owner is either the customer, retailer, or distributor respectively identified with C, R, or D. With PO=MF and NO=D1 for the first transaction we have:
Pedigree Node 1

TD1=(IC+MF+D1);  (12)


TC1=TD1 mod(IC);  (7)


PC1=E^S[TC1, MC];  (8)

wherein the maker provides PC1 and TC1 to a first distributor D1 who can authenticate the article, data, and coding with use of public client software provided by the maker which calculates:

MC=E^-S[TC1, PC1];  (9)


PIC=E^P{e, MC}; and  (10)

compares this PIC with the PIC derived by the fixed coding structure, e.g. with:

PIC=MF mod (IC).  (5)

The public key derivation of the PIC must match the independently derived derivation of the PIC from the maker using data, preferably a MF, that identifies the maker and the IC: i.e. with the mathematical value of the PIC derived with the fixed coding structure and held in memory in the public client software.

A second pedigree node similarly has:

Pedigree Node 2

TD2=(IC+D1+D2);  (12)


TC2=TD2 mod(IC);  (7)


PC2=E^S[TC2, MC];  (8)

wherein the first distributor D1 provides TC2 & PC2 to a second distributor D2 who can authenticate the article, data, and coding with use of public client software provided by the maker which calculates:

MC=E^-S[TC2, PC2];  (9)


PIC=E^P{e, MC}; and  (10)

compares this PIC with that preferably held in memory in the public client software and generated by equation (5): PIC=MF mod (IC).

A third pedigree node similarly has:

Pedigree Node 3

TD3=(IC+D2+R);  (12)


TC3=TD3mod(IC);  (7)


PC3=E^S[TC3, MC];  (8)

wherein a second distributor D2 provides PC3 & TC3 to a retailer (R) who can authenticate the article, data, and coding with use of public client software provided by the maker which calculates:

MC=E^-S[TC3, PC3];  (9)


PIC=E^p{e, MC}; and  (10)

compares this PIC with that preferably held in memory in the public client software and generated by equation (5): PIC=MF mod (IC).

A fourth pedigree node similarly has:

Pedigree Node 4

TD4=(IC+R+C);  (12)


TC4=TD4 mod(IC);  (7)


PC4=E^s[TC4, MC];  (8)

wherein the retailer R provides TD4=TD_FINAL, preferably printed on a sales receipt, to a customer (C) who can authenticate the article, data, and coding with use of public client software provided by the maker which calculates:

TD_FINAL=(IC+R+C);  (12)


TC4=TD4 mod(IC);  (7)


MC=E^-S[TC4, PC_FINAL];  (9)


PIC=E^P{e, MC}; and  (10)

compares this PIC with that preferably held in memory in the public client software and generated by equation (5): PIC=MF mod (IC).

Alternatively, R can provide both TC_FINAL & PC_FINAL to the customer and the public client software restricted to equations (9) & (10) in the same manner suggested for the first three pedigree nodes in the above example. And, for the same reason, the public client software can include equations (12) and (7) as well as (9) and (10) in the previous pedigree nodes if desired. Or the public client can be available two different forms, as suggested in the above example, with the public client available to intermediaries being different than that available to the general public. This is suggested to protect the value of the invariant maker code, MC, as secret to the public and unnecessary in authentification thereby while MC is required in generation of the variable codes: in equation (8) in the above example.

As mentioned earlier C, data identifying the customer, preferably included in the TD can be replaced by a password (PW) whereby equation (12) above becomes:

TD_FINAL=(IC+R+PW);  (13)

which facilitates transfer of the article concerned to subsequent owners who, given the PW, can validate legitimate ownership with input of the PW necessary to obtain matching of the PIC calculated from the flexible coding progression with the PIC calculated from the fixed coding progression.

If a password, PW, is utilized it is selected by the customer and inputted in the final pedigree node for generation of equations (13), (7) & (9), (10) and is subsequently entered into the public client software in authentification by any subsequent owner of the article preferably with input of the other data required of equation (13): IC & R, both further preferably printed on a receipt. The data identifying the customer can be included on a receipt as well if desired. This is suggested particularly for product such as pharmaceuticals that are not intended to be subsequently transferred to another owner. The customer can also use their name as a PW and the data identifying the customer, C, be hidden as a third option.

In any case it is necessary to enter TD_FINAL, equal to TD4 in the above example, into the public client software in authentification. If C is used the public client software can calculate the entire mathematical progression of equations (12), (7), (9), (10) in verification by matching the two PICs. It is preferred that the IC be printed upon the article or container for the same and necessary that TD_FINAL include the IC. The name of the retailer, or data R identifying the retailer, is preferably also included in TD_FINAL but is not strictly necessary and, as mentioned earlier, the TD may include intermediaries D and a MF if desired.

A receipt bearing the TD_FINAL or the TC_FINAL & PC_FINAL printed thereupon can be transferred with the article in subsequent transactions as discussed above. The customer: i.e. last party to a pedigree node generating transaction dependent coding reflecting the identities of the parties involved in transaction; and any subsequent legitimate owner can access the public client software made available by the maker in authentification of the article with entrance of the TD_FINAL inclusive of the IC or the IC, TC_FINAL & PC_FINAL.

The public client software performing this data processing in verification of authenticity is preferably available in a plurality of different forms or avenues: Internet; land line telephone, digital radio frequency (RF) telephone: i.e. short message system cellular telephone (SMS cell phone); or any offline computer. The public client software is preferably generic to a maker, or a line of product by a particular maker, to enhance public access and verification. Copies of the public client software are intended to be freely available. Duplication of this software does not present an opportunity for counterfeiters because authentification is inclusive of the identity of the last legitimate owner.

It is lastly commented that no system is unbreakable given sufficient time and resources. The methodology disclosed herein has many 'one way functions' that are easy and efficient for legitimate parties to utilize but are computationally infeasible and costly to break for illegitimate reasons, whether for economic gain or other reasons. Key length or character string length can be increased or decreased as considered appropriate for the protection desired. For many products such as pharmaceuticals the time required to break a code can easily exceed the useful life time of the item concerned or require a cost to compromise exceeds any possible profit to be derived from the compromise. For other more valuable items the time required to break sufficiently lengthy coding can exceed the life time of an opponent.

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